The political economy of state capture in central Europe by Innes, Abby
  
Abby Innes 
The political economy of state capture in 
central Europe 
 






Innes, Abby (2013) The political economy of state capture in central Europe. JCMS: Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 52 (1). pp. 88-104. ISSN 0021-9886  
 
DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12079  
 
© 2013 The Author(s) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies © 2013 John Wiley & Sons 
Ltd. 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/54670/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: August 2014 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 






This article demonstrates that the majority of new EU member states experience serious 
problems of state capture. It argues that Central European states cluster around two 
dominant modes of party competition. In the first, predominantly ideologically-committed 
elites (Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia and Estonia), established relatively ‘electoral 
professional’ party competitions only to face deepening fiscal constraints on mainstream 
ideological competition. Following the collapse of the social democratic left both 
Hungary and Poland experienced attempts to re-assert political monopoly i.e. ‘party 
state capture’. In the second group (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and 
Latvia), more entrepreneurial political elites established ‘brokerage’ party systems in 
which public policy remains a side-product of an essentially economic competition. All 
five states show high levels of ‘corporate state capture’ in which public power is 
exercised primarily for private gain. These findings contest the more optimistic 








The Political Economy of State Capture in Central Europe 
 
 
The stable party competitions and Weberian states of post-war Western Europe were 
founded on strong elite commitments to democracy and socially embedded through 
sustained productivity growth and universally rising living standards. But those 
conditions have never existed in Central Europe (see Epstein, this volume). Consequently 
their states are not consolidating as those of post-war Western Europe did nor are they 
likely to in the foreseeable future. What we are seeing instead, this paper argues, are 
serious problems of state capture not just in the usual suspects, Romania, Bulgaria and 
now Hungary but in the majority of the new member states. 
 
The argument advanced here is that the region is peculiarly vulnerable to two modes of 
state capture: party state capture and corporate state capture. In the former parties re-
politicise the state in pursuit of political monopoly. In the latter public power is exercised 
primarily for private gain, and private interests pay to subvert the legitimate channels of 
political influence (Hellman et al, 2010, pp. 2-3). While it is plausible that both modes 
could operate together the evidence suggests two surprisingly clear clusters of Central 
European states around a dominant mode, with some relatively non-corrupted systems 
facing vivid attempts to re-monopolise the values and allegiance of the state (e.g. 
Hungary, Poland) and the more corrupted systems showing a clear and consistent 
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prioritisation of the extraction of financial value (e.g. in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria). In 
the latter, attempts to penetrate the state are evidently aimed more at financial than 
political monopoly. Post-EU membership the only systematic attempt to roll back 
democracy has occurred where hitherto effective representation failed for political 
economic reasons: in Hungary.  
 
The clustering of states seems to follow from distinct patterns of party competition; one 
established on the basis of public representation, the other on the basis of corporate 
competition between only nominally ‘political’ actors. Which pattern took root was 
determined by the level of initial elite commitment to democratic values and its 
sustainability was subject to political economic conditions. The early and deep 
institutionalisation of these modes and hence the clear clustering of cases was possible 
because of the near total character of institutional site-clearing and rebuilding that ensued 
in the post-communist transition.  
 
Our order of business then is to establish where each of the new member states stand in 
this picture; to explore why much of the political science literature has tended to be over-
optimistic about party-state development and democratic consolidation in the region; to 
unpack the mode of party competition thesis in more depth and to provide critical case 
studies: Poland and the Czech Republic. In conclusion the paper explores why, excepting 
in egregious violations of the separation of powers (see Sedelmeier, this volume), the 
current EU can do little to change these trends once they are established.  
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State capture in practice and theory 
The World Bank Governance Indicator, ‘control of corruption’ (Kaufmann et al, 2010, p. 
4) offers a reliable measure for corporate state capture and the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Latvia, Bulgaria and Romania have consistently fallen within the mid 50
th
 to mid 60
th
 
percentile worldwide rankings (1996-2011), placing them in the same cohort as South 
Africa, Brazil and Peru. The Czech Republic moved downwards from scores in the high 
70
th
 percentiles in the mid-1990s to a plateau of low to mid-60
th
 scores by 2000, from 
which it has not risen. In fact, performance has tended to plateau through the 2000s in all 





 percentiles during the same period, with Lithuania staying 
steady in the mid to high 60
th
 percentile. Poland and Hungary, however, saw deteriorating 
control of corruption performance during the duration of notably anti-system 
governments, those of Law and Justice in Poland (2005-07) and FIDESZ in Hungary 
(2010- ). 
 
For party state capture we can use the World Bank Governance Indicator of ‘government 
effectiveness’ which measures perceptions of the quality of public services and policy 
formulation and the degree of administrative independence from political pressures. 





 percentiles (1996-2011). But Hungary’s rankings steadily 
deteriorated after 2008 and worsened through the FIDESZ administration, with Poland 
likewise seeing a drop to the high 60
th
 percentile ranking coincident with the short-lived 
government of Law and Justice. Lithuania saw its government effectiveness improve 
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from 2004 onwards, moving into the 70
th
 percentile rankings. What is also notable and 
helps explain their unwarranted reputation for consolidation is that the Czech and Slovak 




 percentiles for government effectiveness. But 
as Darden has demonstrated, between the two world-wide clusters of negligibly corrupt 
states with high government efficiency and failed states with massive corruption there is 
actually no linear correlation between state capacity and state corruption (Darden, 2008). 
In other words it is quite possible to combine high corruption with high social order.  
 
One reason these trajectories may come as a surprise is that the transitions literature has 
tended to draw more optimistic conclusions about the consolidation of Central European 
states versus the deterioration of those further east. But the evidence of the last ten years 
suggests the reason for this optimism may be methodological, i.e. that the dominant 
institutionalist approaches have downplayed the substance of ideological values and 
government practice. From Hellman (1998), through Grzymała-Busse and Jones-Luong 
(2002) and O’Dwyer (2006) to Grzymała-Busse (2007) institutionalist accounts have 
tended to agree that it is the institutional robustness of competition between political 
elites that explains degrees of Weberian state building: a formalised variable on which 
Central Europe has fared relatively well. But these studies have carried discretely 
pluralist assumptions over from the post-war West European context about how an 
institutionally robust political system begins competition and how, once started, the 
mechanics of polyarchy sustain the necessary incentives to take the state out of the 
political game. But the sharpening political conflicts and deteriorating government 
performance through the 1970s and 1980s in the West had forced pluralist thinkers to 
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admit the dependence of their assumptions on the ideological and political economic 
conditions of that post-war era: conditions which Central Europe has simply never had. 
 
It is because of these missing conditions that the institutional robustness of competition 
alone can make little sense of the advent of anti-system, state-capturing governments in 
two countries that started the transition with among the strongest political competitions 
and state building thereafter: Poland and Hungary (Grzymała-Busse, 2007, pp. 11-12). Or 
why the Czech Republic, endowed with the most institutionally stable bi-polar party 
competition and the most classically pluralist structural conditions of the entire region 
(O’Dwyer, 2006), has shown levels of corporate state capture on a par with those of 
Ukraine (World Bank, 2011, p. 20).
1
 More generally, the ongoing failure of the majority 
of new member states to consolidate autonomous state structures over time runs counter 
to the pluralist optimism that underpins these institutionalist texts.  
 
Given space constraints I will focus on the rightly influential and exceptionally 
comprehensive text by Anna Grzymała-Busse, Rebuilding Leviathan, to highlight those 
factors that institutionalist methods necessarily elide but that with the benefit of hindsight 
are significant. Leviathan also identified the institutional robustness of party competition 
as central to state-building dynamics. It argued that clear, critical and monitoring party 
competition and plausible governing alternatives were what drove rational actors to take 
                                                 
1
 According to World Economic Forum survey data from 2008, the latest available, the Czech Republic 
ranked equal with Ukraine for the diversion of public funds to “companies, individuals or groups due to 
corruption.” This placed the Republic fifth worst out of twenty two post-communist states, behind, in order, 
Bulgaria, Armenia, the Kyrgyz Republic and Russia.  
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the state out of the political game since the credible threat of their imminent replacement 
in government made it prudent for them do so (Grzymała-Busse, 2007, pp. 10-15). In 
Leviathan then, the flaw of the Czech, Slovak, Latvian and Bulgarian systems compared 
to those of Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia and Lithuania was that they came into 
their transitions semi-formed in terms of political competition. In contrast to the higher 
performing cases their legacies of relatively weak dissident oppositions and hence hard-
line communist parties had prevented the emergence of reformed ex-communist social 
democratic parties to play the disciplining role of strong opponents. The resulting 
dominance of single parties meant less state reform and explained higher levels of state 
exploitation. But since the World Bank indicators show Leviathan is entirely correct in 
identifying the higher corruption of these ‘intermediate’ cases what is it exactly that this 
institutionalist approach is failing to capture? The difficulty is that the book’s formal 
criteria a priori cannot account for the systematic subversion of political competition by a 
relatively dominant party or for the deterioration of political competition in formerly 
more robust competitions. 
 
In practice the unwillingness of more weakly institutionalized party systems to build 
regulated state institutions has done more than allow enormous private benefits for parties 
in otherwise functioning democratic systems: the verdict of Leviathan. Rather, their 
preference for non-regulation in key institutions under the guise of neo-liberalism (Czech 
Republic) or through more clandestine forms of de-institutionalisation (Bulgaria, 
Romania, Latvia and more erratically, in Slovakia) has built a system of incentives for 
primarily, rather than purely opportunistically entrepreneurial party behaviour. What 
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followed was less the incidental exploitation of the state than the evolution of parties into 
brokerage firms: a far more systematically corrupt development than Leviathan implies. 
The theoretically pluralist background to Leviathan would also suggest that this more 
corrupt cluster should have improved their state-building over time rather than levelling 
out at a globally just-above-average level of performance even ten years into EU 
membership. In their ground-breaking essay on state-building written just a few years 
earlier, Jones-Luong and Grzymała-Busse had argued that the stronger a country’s 
capacity for voluntary association and popular mobilisation the more elite competition 
would be constrained into robust forms. Secondly, the more formal institutions with 
credible capacity existed over informal norms the more competition would be constrained 
to operate within those institutions (Grzymała-Busse and Jones-Luong, 2002, pp. 537-
538). But far from such optimistic trajectories playing out in these cases their flat-lining 
performance suggests that the early institutionalisation of corporate state capture pre-
empted the constructive relationship anticipated between political systems, deepening 
electoral cleavages and civil organisation. The competitive element in what Mungiu calls 
‘competitive particularism’ (Mungiu, 2006, p. 94) remained motivated by access to state 
assets. 
 
As for those countries that got off to a more competitive start, institutionalist indicators 
necessarily strain to capture changes in values within these systems.  A priori such 
indicators cannot identify anti-system actors who fulfil the institutional criteria of 
robustly competitive players but undermine the separation of powers: a methodological 
constraint revealed as problematic in more recent years. While Hungary ostensibly 
 8 
confirms Leviathan’s depiction of ‘declining competition equalling declining 
performance’ -  FIDESZ became more ambitious for state power following the collapse 
of the main competitor, the Hungarian Socialist Party – this cannot explain why the pillar 
of the liberal left mainstream in Hungary suddenly collapsed over ten years into transition 
nor why, even before the Socialists’ troubles, FIDESZ had indicated anti-pluralist 
tendencies in its first administration. The rise of Poland’s anti-system Law and Justice 
Party is straightforwardly confounding of the institutionalist theory since party 
competition has remained strong. 
 
When it came to understanding cases of deteriorating state performance Grzymała-Busse 
was clear in Leviathan that she wasn’t trying to theorise institutional ‘stickiness’: thus if 
the robustness of competition changed she argued that this change would have immediate 
effects on state exploitation (Grzymała-Busse, 2007, p. 15, ftn. 39). But though 
theoretically consistent this makes for a restricted theory of democratic state building 
insofar as consolidation remains mysterious. The implication of Leviathan is that 
institutionally robust competition must exist at all times for state integrity to be sustained, 
but this is questionable given that post-war Western Europe experienced numerous party 
crises that failed to undermine the integrity of the given state, and Latin America is 
replete with cases of historically competitive party systems and weak state-building. All 
of which suggests that political competition is a necessary but insufficient guarantor of 
Weberian standards. 
 
Legacies, elites, party organisation and competitive strategies 
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The high point of polyarchic analyses had coincided with the post-war era of ‘embedded 
liberalism’ (Ruggie, 1982) but the benefits to democracy of pluralist political structures 
had turned out to depend on vocational elite commitments to democratic values and 
political economic conditions that maintained their popularity. The West European party 
systems literature has consequently long monitored the corrosion of stable party 
competitions after the ‘Golden Age’ of European growth. From Kircheimer’s (1966) 
‘catch all’ parties to Panebianco’s (1988) ‘electoral-professional’ parties, Koole’s (1994) 
modern cadre parties, Katz and Mair’s (1995) cartel parties and Hopkin and Paolucci’s 
(1999) ‘parties as business firms’ this literature has focused on socioeconomic changes 
and concomitant shifts in the ideological values and strategies of political elites. As these 
scholars established, the resulting changes in the identity, social embeddedness and 
organisational characteristics of parties have significantly altered the effective constraints 
on governing elites.  
 
If we review Central Europe’s revolutionary legacies we can see a clear distinction 
between political elites that began with deep ideological commitments to democracy and 
those that did not, the issue being whether the latter were nevertheless strategically 
constrained and if so, by what. In Politics Without a Past Cohen distinguishes 
‘ideological’ and ‘mass elites’. ‘Ideological’ elites she describes as those that remained 
bearers of alternative ideological visions to Communism: democratic and nationalist, 
civic and ethnic. These elites preserved historical consciousness of non-Communist ideas 
and, either via organised dissent through the last decades of Communism or through the 
resonance of nationalist identity politics, possessed connections to relatively stably 
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defined and coherent social bases (Cohen, 1999, pp. 5-6). Applying Cohen we can 
identify the dissident and reformist-led parties of Poland, Hungary, but also Estonia, 
Lithuania and Slovenia as standing within this category. 
 
In distinction to ‘ideological elites’ Cohen developed the idea of the ‘mass elite’ to 
describe the product of Czechoslovak Communist socialisation (the fragmented 
ideological elite around Vaclav Havel and Charter 77 notwithstanding). A ‘mass elite’ is 
a political elite with the characteristics of the mass as associated with the writings of 
Hannah Arendt: a group that has been unhinged from traditional institutions and ties by a 
militantly orthodox or repressive Communism but without being integrated by any 
modern ideological framework or interest groups. Cohen identified ‘mass elites’ as 
ideologically non-committed and hence motivated by short term personal self-interest 
(Cohen, 1999, pp. 5-6). The Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia and with 
caveats, Slovakia have clearly remained dominated by mass elite parties.  
 
 The strategic calculations of these relatively socially and ideologically unanchored ‘mass 
elites’ regarding party longevity were necessarily different from those of relatively 
constrained ‘ideological’ elites. Two different logics of competition thus emerged in the 
region over time, logics which were further confronted with the management of 
performance in government and the electoral response to it.  
 
Where parties were attached to emerging electoral cleavages and social bases through 
their ideological commitments they developed into relatively ‘electoral-professional’ 
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parties i.e. historically rooted parties increasingly dependent on political ‘professionals’ 
to develop new strategies of party competition (Panebianco, 1988). For such parties, 
seeking to maintain the credibility of their normative identities, programmatic 
competition was the most sustainable source of party establishment, assuming conducive 
political economic conditions over time. And as Tavits has shown, those that also 
invested in organisational strength and membership, other things being equal, fared better 
than their ideological matches in like cases (Tavits, 2012).  
 
Even more than their kin in Western Europe, however, these Central European electoral-
professional parties confronted daunting political-economic challenges in government. 
Party state capture occurred when a pillar of this competition, on the social democratic 
left in both instances, was knocked out by deepening fiscal constraints on credible 
economic competition. Given the region’s dominant socio-economic electoral cleavage 
the collapse of the left ushered in a political battle for the support of lower income voters 
but in conditions where the impossibility of sustaining redistributive programmes had 
been proven. Party state capture duly followed from conspiracy-rich nationalist appeals 
that required the ‘renewal’ of the state and the closing down of democratic competitions 
now argued to have failed ‘the people’. 
 
Mass elite parties, in the meantime, carried the extreme elite flexibility we associate with 
‘business-firm’ parties. Hopkin and Paolucci had observed that new parties in the post-
authoritarian democracies of Greece, Portugal and Spain had faced strong pressures 
towards the ‘electoral-professionalism’ of the established parties of Western Europe but 
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without the inherited constraints on pushing that model to its logical conclusion. 
Consequently they could more readily become parties, in Down’s phrase, ‘that might 
formulate policies in order to win elections rather than win elections in order to formulate 
policies’ (Downs, 1957, p. 28). Thus “the [business-firm] party, instead of being a 
voluntary organisation with essentially social objectives, becomes a kind of ‘business 
firm’, in which the public goods produced are incidental to the real objectives of those 
leading it; in Olson’s terminology, policy is a ‘by-product’” (Hopkin and Paolucci, 1999, 
pp. 310-312).  
 
Since the 1989 revolutions had called for the dismantling of the Communist patronage 
state the continuation of that monopoly was impossible, but the greater the post-
revolutionary continuation of mass elite control the greater the capacity of these elites to 
monopolise the process of the state’s demise. Central Europe’s mass elite parties, 
however, unlike Forza Italia, were not established businesses seeking access to 
democratic parliaments, but were formed by MPs arising in either reform-communist or 
‘opposition’ parliamentary groupings who instrumentalised the dismantling of the state to 
establish brokerage businesses and party hierarchies built on those businesses. Such 
parties established themselves by monopolising and asset-stripping state resources and 
information e.g. state reserves, including of oil and metals, domestic and foreign 
company data and protected themselves by disabling existing formal state oversight over 
government action (Ganev, 2001).  
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These measures gave first-mover advantage to Communist elite networks in what 
developed into electorate-mediated competitions over on-going brokerage rights over 
state-assets. Even where Communist elite ties to the state were ostensibly broken by the 
election of dissident led governments, as in the Czech and Slovak Republics, we see 
functionally equivalent efforts to maximise elite discretion after their small ideological 
elite was effectively purged following the partition of Czechoslovakia by two mass elite 
parties (Innes, 2001). In the five countries starting out with predominantly mass elites 
their convergence on the brokerage model is evident despite very different economic 
inheritances and reform time-lines. And in the absence of vocationally democratic elites 
voters in these systems can do little more than churn through different factions of 
political-business networks, hence their convergence towards chronically high corporate 
state capture rankings combined with high voter volatility and party turnover rates. 
 
Shefter concluded that ‘internally created parties’, i.e. those emerging from within state 
institutions, will consider patronage a viable option as a key survival strategy (Shefter, 
1994). Given that the majority of Central European parties emerged and still emerge from 
within existing parliamentary parties we should not be surprised that only when they 
were led by committed and constrained democratic elites were there efforts to build 
Weberian states. Thus where Leviathan argued that it was robustness of competition that 
counted, I would contend that it was the predominance of vocational elites that 
determined a democratic mode of institution-building. The result is the same division of 
cases as Leviathan’s but on a different basis and with different expectations.  It is also 
worth noting how un-amenable the corrupt cluster is to explanation through different 
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variables often cited as relevant in accounting for party system, and hence party-state, 
dynamics, i.e. in creating barriers to entry. In practice, variation in electoral systems or 
the effective number of parties is too high across both clusters to account for the 
patterning that we see. The following two critical case studies, the first of the pressures 
on ‘electoral professional’ competition in Poland and the second on the evolution of 
brokerage parties in the Czech Republic, are offered to test this theory - with both cases 
providing confirmation. 
 
Ideological competitions, government performance and party-state capture: Poland 
As the country with the strongest and most diverse legacy of dissent: an established 
dissident elite rooted in large sections of society, a committed generation of reformist 
former communists and a society distinguished by a vibrant and uniquely independent 
Catholic Church, Polish experience illustrates the pressures facing even the most well 
founded party systems of the region: those engaged in relatively ‘electoral professional’ 
modes of programmatic competition. Like their Western counterparts, these party 
systems had to address the pressing public policy problems of the day to maintain their 
credibility (Kitschelt, 2010, pp. 669-670). Moreover, with a dominant socioeconomic 
cleavage regionally (Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2009) a successful economic policy 
had to stand at the heart of any government’s reputation for competence. If we then 
consider the astonishing scope of the transitional project of marketisation and integration 
into the Single European Market, particularly for an economy as in need of industrial 
restructuring as Poland’s, it is clear that the biggest performative challenges would be 
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confronted by those parties on the economic ‘left’: i.e. by those seeking to mitigate the 
social impact of marketisation on lower income groups via public spending. 
 
When Kitschelt showed how modern, office-seeking West European social democratic 
parties pivoted left-libertarian or right-centrist depending on the credible competitors to 
their left or to their right, even the centre-right pivoting social democrats retained 
positions on the economic left (socialist-capitalist) axis (Kitschelt, 1994). If this retention 
of leftist economic space becomes impossible, however, i.e. if social democratic parties 
in government lose all serious traction on social justice issues in economic terms, then 
this logically forces the collapse of their normative project and the credibility of the party 
as such. It diminishes the space for economic representation and opens up the risk of anti-
system players increasing their vote among lower income voters. This scenario is exactly 
played out in the Polish, but also, notably, in the Hungarian case. 
 
The Polish ex-communist social democratic left had risen on claims to reformism, pro-
Europeanism and its ability to mitigate the worst social costs of transition. 
Programmatically constrained by the structural requirements of transition, the social 
Democrats adopted a stance of social-liberal technocracy only for them to collapse when 
the established post-communist- and already comparatively minimal welfare bargain 
became untenable and could not be credibly reengineered within the terms of adopted 
emerging market economic orthodoxies. Given a regime divide of notable historical 
potency Polish Social Democrats were constrained to not simply start out as market-
supporting but to pivot rightwards in search of higher growth over time, only for this to 
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mean that when growth proved insufficient the party was effectively forced to exit the 
leftist economic space. As an ex-communist party the Polish Social Democrats would 
have risked accusations of ideological recidivism had they dared pivot economically 
leftwards, an anyway unappealing move given no credible competitors on that flank.  
 
In practice high growth rates were not high enough to maintain credible welfare 
bargaining in the context of liberal fiscal regimes and Poland had hit fiscal difficulties 
long before the 2008 financial crisis. More specifically, Poland’s Social Democrats 
struggled to maintain their transitional social contract wherein the most vulnerable to 
market reforms - pensioners and the unemployed - were to be protected through indexed 
income transfers. Successive governments faced ongoing domestic commitment and 
continuing investor pressure to cut public spending on the one hand but continuous 
upward pressures on public finances on the other as deindustrialisation, restructuring, 
FDI subsidies, inequality and, in more recent years, aging took hold. The funding bind 
was further tightened by the unintended consequences of liberalisation and liberal tax 
regimes, the deepening dualisation of Poland’s labour markets in particular. As Polish 
restructuring began in the early 1990s the taxation and social security contributions 
needed to maintain income transfers induced a significant tax burden. Because neo-liberal 
economic orthodoxy dictated low tax regimes for personal income tax (Poland saw 
declining progressivity of PIT and corporate rates through 2000-11 (OECDa) and this 
was reinforced by a regional race to the bottom on tax competition for FDI, the taxation 
burden was shifted onto employers. This induced what Esping-Andersen has elsewhere 
dubbed the ‘death spiral’ scenario of low employment and lowered tax contributions, 
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requiring high payroll contributions to support the welfare system, which further lowers 
employment, stunting growth and business investment and increasing welfare pressures 
(Pierson, 2001, p. 87).  
 
Polish Social Democrats were eventually forced to break their initial promises of indexed 
income transfers and improved welfare. But even after transfer entitlements were slashed 
- unemployment insurance coverage was cut from 80 per cent to 20 per cent already 
through the 1990s (Riboud et al, 2002, pp. 3,7,10) and unemployment benefit as a 
percentage of previous earnings reduced to 10.2 per cent by 2007, one of the OECD’s 
lowest levels (OECDb) - the Social Democrats found themselves without the fiscal 
reserves to develop even minimal endogenous growth strategies e.g. higher investment in 
education, training and infrastructure, on which liberal social democratic parties in 
Western Europe have increasingly depended. As the region-wide tax competition 
deepened, spurred on by the EU’s crackdown on subsidies, not only did Poland’s liberal 
left lose its margin for any credible economic policy in social justice terms, but over time 
they had also steadily lost the institutional requirements for more coordinated economic 
solutions, as union density fell and unions were estranged by radically liberal labour 
market policies (Ost, 2005).  
 
The denouement in democratic system stability came with the Social Democrats’ 
Hausner plan which proposed cutting public administration and already minimalist social 
transfers in conditions of 19 per cent unemployment. By 2004 Prime Minister Miller 
could no longer plead the ‘extraordinary politics’ of transition and the normative 
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contradiction of austerity measures coming from a ‘leftist’ government proved fatal: the 
programme also coincided with a series of personal corruption scandals – the worst to 
date - that suggested a leftwing government lining its own pocket while emptying those 
of its electorate. The SLD duly saw a 25 percentage point decline in support between 
2003-04 due to the combination of scandal, spending cuts and Miller’s neo-liberal 
leanings, with support of those with secondary education falling further than among 
higher educated voters: a proxy for income in Polish polls (CBOS, 2011). The Alliance 
won only 11.5 per cent of the vote in the 2005 election and consequently barely a quarter 
of its previous seats in the Sejm. The result was the fragmentation of the Polish left and 
the advent of Law and Justice’s coalition government: the most socially illiberal 
administration since 1989. This was followed by Tusk’s liberal government: a 
continuation of ‘institutionally robust’ competition but now between pro- and anti-system 
parties.  
 
As the Polish case illustrates, the loss of the left’s normative credibility is particularly 
severe when the failures to manage welfare bargaining are apparently endogenous to 
economic management. But the consequences for the evolution of the state are potentially 
greater because the collapse of effective economic representation by the left in Poland but 
also in Hungary necessarily limited the credible space of economic competition and 
encouraged competing political elites to abandon ‘mainstream’ political-economic 
discourses (Ost, 2005). In these circumstances those political players not constrained by 
value commitments and seeking to gain the newly de-aligned lower income vote were 
highly likely to choose re-politicisation of the state as a powerful alternative source of 
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party longevity. Constituency-building through programmatic competition was no longer 
credible in economic terms and ‘brokerage’ style corruption was riskier in these more 
consolidated systems. 
 
If we extend this account of the supply-side vulnerabilities of our more programmatic 
electoral systems we can see that in Lithuania the Social Democrat’s eventual shift to 
neo-liberal economic policies appeared more determined by external shocks than 
endogenous party strategy. And here the response to the Russian economic crisis and EU 
accession was a populist attempt to outflank the social democrats from the left. The social 
democratic left and pro-system competition survived most strongly, that is, up until the 
financial crisis, where coordinated market development and competitive corporatist 
strategies were pursued from the outset, uniquely, in Slovenia. Social democratic parties 
have also survived, though not thrived – Estonia has yet to see a Social Democratic 
government - where welfare preferences have been traded off against a dominant national 
question, as in Estonia but also to a degree in Lithuania.  
 
Mass elite competitions, brokerage parties and corporate state capture: Czech 
Republic 
The Czech Republic is an open society that experienced clear state-ness (after 1993), 
relatively functional administrative and fiscal legacies, low inequality and relatively high 
socio-economic development, relatively high and uniformly distributed FDI (Hancke and 
Kureckova, 2008) and international integration in NATO and the EU. According to 
recent studies the Czechs also have the most distinct socioeconomic/left-right cleavage of 
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the region (Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2009). In this, by far the most structurally 
advantaged of the putative ‘brokerage’ cases therefore we might have most reasonably 
expected a positive reform of the party-state relationship over time. Because of the 
relatively weak opposition, however, the values of the first Czech coalition government 
and its dominant party, Vaclav Klaus’s Civic Democratic Party (ODS), turned out to be 
critical in framing the new political game towards corporate state capture.  
 
Constituted out of communist ‘grey-zone’ mass elites the ODS claimed belief in the 
impersonal power of the market and seized the technocratic high ground by insisting that 
it alone understood how to institutionalise a market system. The party thus co-opted the 
discursively ‘scientific’ mode of the old system, albeit now in Hayekian terms, so that the 
economy and not democratic institution-building were supposed to be the engine from 
which all social transformation, including democratisation, would follow. But while even 
a quick review of the ODS’s actual economic policies would reveal a highly pragmatic 
rather than neo-liberal approach to market-making, Klaus held firm to party control of the 
state and its non-regulation. As a rent-seeking mass elite party, therefore, the ODS was 
consistent in its ideological inconsistencies. From the early 1990s to the time of writing 
the ODS has justified the failure to professionalize the civil service as an anti-state 
principle having undermined the one potentially serious reform attempt made by the 
Social Democrats.  
 
By the end of the Klaus coalition governments of the early 1990s, which ended in 1997 
amidst major bank collapses and party finance scandals involving the right wing coalition 
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members and Social Democrats, the ODS had lost its credibility as a party able to offer 
growth without pain and the ministries had clearly developed as political fiefdoms. 
Support for the centre-left Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) had duly risen as it 
embraced a platform of ‘cleaning up the state’ and their ‘Clean Hands’ campaign of 1998 
proved the tipping point. The ČSSD won 26.5 per cent of the vote in 1996 and 32.3 per 
cent in 1998. However, as the rising party of a ‘catch all’ opposition the ČSSD had also 
become increasingly factionalised and dominated by its own rising mass elite factions.  
 
The 1998 elections results produced a narrow ČSSD victory but after failed coalition 
talks the remaining option was a ‘toleration’ agreement with the ODS. The resulting 
Opposition Agreement gave de facto legislative veto powers to the hitherto dominant 
party and Klaus extracted a more majoritarian electoral law (a move to D’Hondt) as the 
ODS’s price. President Havel decried the Agreement as ideologically incoherent and the 
Supreme Court declared the electoral law unconstitutional in 2001. But in the interim the 
deal undermined the former right-wing rival and coalition partner, the Christian 
Democratic Union/Czech People’s Party (KDU-ČSL) and the new Freedom Union: a 
breakaway faction and would-be replacement for the ODS, now exposed as impotent. 
The Agreement also undermined the ČSSD government since the ODS voted down their 
major proposals even as it extracted patronage and legislative favours (Innes, 2001). The 
ČSSD thus rode out the second recession unable to secure much of their mandate, 
weakening the party’s ideological members even as the process of bailing out and 
privatising the Republic’s banking system strengthened the party’s more corrupt mass 
elites. According to the former Senate Vice Chairman, Edvard Outrata (Independent), the 
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Opposition Agreement of 1998 “divided all the most important jobs between parties 
while the ČSSD pretended to govern.” As such it “reintroduced the worst aspects of the 
Pětka”: the group of five coalition party leaders in 1930s Czechoslovakia who had 
colluded in entrenching their control of the state. (Author interview, 2005). Within a year 
the ‘Clean Hands’ campaign had stalled and was cancelled after those responsible were 
found to have exploited investigations for their own purposes (East European 
Constitutional Review, 2002). 
 
The isolation of ‘ideological’ factions within the Social Democrats is indicated by the 
fate of civil service reform. Once in government the only ČSSD minister determined to 
de-politicise and professionalize the civil service was Vladimir Špidla, the new Minister 
for Labour and Social Affairs but a ‘grassroots’ politician who had joined the party in 
1990 and only entered parliament in 1998: a popular technocrat on the (anti-communist) 
left of his party but hopelessly weak in factional terms. The resulting Service Act 
218/2002 was only passed, already weakened in substance by ODS, so as to guarantee 
EU accession, but once accession was granted this EU leverage was lost. The 
implementation date of Act 218/2002 was consequently not just repeatedly postponed but 
eventually dropped. In November 2006 the Social Democrat government adopted a 
Resolution (Number. 1232) returning the basic management of the civil service to the 
Ministry of Interior. In August 2007 the new ODS-led coalition both postponed the Act 
again, to 2012, and then announced it would replace it, suggesting it would prepare a new 
law in which personnel decision-making was maintained in the hands of individual 
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ministries (Scherpereel, 2009, p. 215). The abandoned law has yet to be replaced with 
new proposals.  
 
For a survey of the rise of corrupt practices, internal network disputes and the growing 
dominance of formerly senior communists in the top ranks of the ČSSD, Jordan offers a 
compelling account up to 2002 (Jordan, 2002). It is clear by now, however, that the 
brokerage properties of the emerging party-state relationship have become systemic. 
According to recent data on public procurement, compiled by ZIndex at the Institute of 
Economics, Charles University, 80 per cent of all contracts awarded by Czech ministries 
between 2006-2010 were awarded without competition or ‘in private’. Some 67 per cent 
of purchases occurred entirely outside of the Ministry of Information’s Public 
Procurement Information System (ISVZ) and a further 14 per cent involved an identical 
number of candidates and winners, typically, one. Only the Ministry of Finance had more 
than 50 per cent of its contracts going through nominally traceable channels (52 per cent) 
– and as the purse-holder to the other ministries this, post-privatisation, is not surprising. 
Every other ministry, however, showed less than 30 per cent of their procurement going 
through traceable channels and the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Local Development 
and the Ministry of Justice managed only 17, 14 and 11 per cent of transparent contracts 
respectively. The value of contracts awarded through these opaque channels is estimated 
at 276 billion crowns or roughly one-fifth of the current national debt (ZIndex, 2011).  
 
For everyday politics, party elites have become adept at a form of façade activity in 
which multiple anti-corruption initiatives are launched while the leadership remains safe 
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in the knowledge that none will be implemented. Regulatory legislation can be derailed 
because of the ease of parliamentary amendment and lobbying is unregulated. At the 
ministry level, however, the answer is simply non-execution. For example, back in 1999, 
under Špidla’s influence and under growing pressure from the EU to improve state 
function, a Government Programme for Combating Corruption (PCC) was adopted on 
17
th
 February and re-adopted in more developed form again in 2001, 2002 and 2003. It 
soon became clear, however, that the PCC was so weakly implemented that many of the 
agencies with roles in the Programme had little knowledge of it (SIGMA, 2003: p. 9). By 
2003, moreover, the EU/OECD sponsored organisation SIGMA (Support for 
Improvement in Governance and Management), highlighted the following obstructions to 
clean government in the Czech Republic: a Czech Bribery Law that was broadly in line 
with EU standards but which was unsupervised and so ineffective; a ‘dormant’ Civil 
Service Act [now defunct]; a Conflict of Interest law dating from 1992 which applied to 
no-one below the level of Minister or Administrative Head of Department, for which 
there was little proof of compliance and which provided no sanctions for violations; a 
weak ‘general duty’ to avoid conflicts of interest stated in a broadly un-enforced Labour 
Code and a weakly developed and barely implemented Code of Ethics for public officials 
and elected officials; the absence of effective protection for ‘whistleblowers’ despite a 
legal obligation to report corruption (SIGMA, 2003, p. 10).  
 
SIGMA’s writ ran out with EU accession but hands-off monitoring continued via the 
OECD’s working groups on its Governance Conventions. As with the EU pre-accession 
period, however, Czech authorities continue to combine failure to comply with 
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substantive measures, including the introduction of legal liability for foreign bribery, with 
enthusiasm for soft measures involving the publicising of OECD Conventions and the 
country’s signatory status (OECDc). The EU’s efforts to encourage state capacity 
building through regulatory impact assessments (RIA) and policy audit have also fallen 
on stony ground. The Czech Legislative Rules of Government introduced a RIA 
requirement in 1998 after strong EU encouragement but it only entered into force in 
January 2008 under the technical government of Jan Fischer. And with the Department 
for Regulatory Reform based in the Ministry of Interior the RIA unit had no power to 
monitor or supervise other line ministries which subsequently showed no interest in 
standard adoption (Staranova, 2010, pp. 122,133).  
 
According to Transparency International’s David Ondracka one can speak of the 
privatisation of the Czech party system with the brokerage of state-corporate interests 
dominating all the main political parties from the top down and the bottom up, since the 
limited membership of political parties makes their entrepreneurial takeover at the local 
level easy. The process has intensified as the rents available from privatisation dried up 
and this shrinking market encouraged political parties and their established business 
networks to turn to state-based opportunities. It has consequently ceased to be appropriate 
to look for inner party democracy per se in these parties as their internal party structures 
are determined through vote buying, patronage and manipulation, primarily in the 
services of building brokerage networks. And although the factionalism of the major 
parties might imply a vibrant ideological life, these factions are defined by the competing 
interests of different networks rather than by differences in policy, ideology or 
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personality (Authors interview, 2011). The ascendance of Petr Nečas to the leadership of 
ODS and position of Prime Minister (2010-2013), for example, was widely attributed to 
the fact that this reputedly ‘clean’ politician did not head a brokerage network and was 
consequently the only leader on whom factions could agree. Nečas was nevertheless 
forced to resign in June 2013 following the arrest of his chief aide (and supposed lover) 
for the alleged bribery of MPs and abuse of Military Intelligence: to spy on Mrs Nečas. 
The Czech government remains ‘effective’: the macro economy continues to be managed, 
income transfers paid etc. But across the board of policy making, from welfare to 
education, from energy to environment, new public policies are largely the side-products 
of identified opportunities for rent-seeking by allied party and business elites. 
 
The ODS received their lowest ever electoral vote in the 2010 elections, the ČSSD their 
lowest since 1992 but the institutionalisation of the brokerage party system is illustrated 
by the two main beneficiaries of this volatility. The first ‘breakthrough’ party, TOP09, 
was an attempt to outflank the ODS on the nominally neo-liberal right by the former 
KDU-ČSL faction under Miroslav Kalousek: the Christian Democratic faction most 
mired in corruption scandals through the 1990s. In TOP09 Kalousek consolidated a 
relatively disciplined vehicle re-branded under the popular leadership of the diplomat and 
now Foreign Minister, Karel Schwarzenberg: multiple scandals have ensued. The second 
‘breakthrough’ party, Public Affairs (VV), had championed anti-corruption only to be 
exposed in April 2011 as an ongoing front for a private security firm, ABL. Despite a 
blaze of scandal regarding private payments to VV MPs by the former ABL boss-turned 
Transport Minister (and, it transpired, de facto Interior Minister) Vít Bárta, VV, 
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incredibly, remained in the governing coalition. As for the old guard, Richard Falbr, 
former leader of the Confederation of Czech and Moravian Trades Unions, ČSSD 
Senator and now ČSSD MEP describes the political system as having shifted from one of 
‘basic artificiality’ to one in which ‘corruption is the rule’. ‘The number of actual Social 
Democrats in my party at this point is an absolute minimum’, he concludes (Author 
interview, 2011). In spring 2012 police raided the home of former ČSSD Health Minister 
and MP, David Rath and found 7 million crowns hidden in a wine-box and according to a 
BBC report, a further 30 million under the floorboards. Klaus’s final act as outgoing 
President of the Republic was to declare an amnesty that included among the most 
notorious cases of fraud and embezzlement during his tenure. 
 
Conclusions 
Where has the EU been in all this? The EU’s leverage is necessarily limited in cases of 
party state capture rooted in domestic fiscal constraints and the collapse of economic 
competition. In a region dominated by a growth model in which consumption and 
dependence on foreign capital has been prioritised over increases in employment and 
innovation even the strongest party systems in these open economies are exceptionally 
vulnerable. Long before the European financial crisis the deepening of the region’s fiscal 
constraints had encouraged coping-mechanisms ranging from the proliferation of short-
term employment contracts to the replacement of public welfare by personal debt; 
strategies that precluded the output-legitimacy so important in embedding the values of 
post-war Western European democracies (see also Epstein and Jacoby, this volume).   
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The EU’s leverage in the cases of corporate state capture rooted in brokerage party 
systems is equally weak, why? Because, as Mungiu has pointed out, where public goods 
are distributed on a particularistic basis that mirrors the distribution of economic power 
within these societies, any anti-corruption strategies that these elites care to take on are 
typically adopted and implemented in cooperation ‘with the very predators who control 
the government and, in some cases, the anticorruption instruments themselves’ (Mungiu, 
2006, p. 87). In this light the chronically high rates of voter volatility in these cases – 
between 20-60 per cent in each election between 1990 and 2010, where West European 
party system are hitting a ‘spike’ if volatility exceeds 20 per cent (Dassonneville and 
Hooghe, 2011, pp. 33-34) - is unsurprising, as is the steady rise in the effective number of 
parties at both the electoral and parliamentary levels through the same period, 
encouraging a vicious circle of non-consolidation (Tavits, 2005). The only solution to 
such serious instability is an effective war on particularism and this battle is necessarily 
domestic and civil, as Dimitrova and Buzogány’s article in this volume illustrates so well.  
 
Can the EU at least do something to alter these domestic balances of power? The EU 
already mitigates the imbalances of public investment and development through its 
structural, cohesion and agricultural subsidies. And although these are targeted for abuse 
within the brokerage party systems it would surely have been worse for these countries to 
have opened to the globalised world economy without EU membership and the massive 
subsidies and latterly, bank bailouts that have come with it. But the more pressing issue 
raised by the current Eurozone crisis is whether the EU will seek to re-engineer the model 
of European capitalism away from the dominant neo-liberalism in which the rising profit-
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share and tendency to boom and bust are pitching hitherto stable member states, old and 
new, into unlooked for political storms. Thus the EU has promoted an increasingly liberal 
capitalist game only to find itself in an unprecedented crisis as to how to reinforce its 
legitimacy. In the meantime Central Europe has developed party systems increasingly 
polarised between economically highly liberal right-wing parties who speak to the socio-
economic ‘winners’ and, absent credibly programmatic social democrats, socially and 
politically illiberal parties seeking to attract ‘the losers’. And half of the new member 
states are characterised by brokerage parties that instrumentalise the effective mainstream 
space of ideological competition to primarily private ends. Consequently we should not 






Buzogány, A and Dimitrova, A (2014) ‘Making EU rules work for better governance: 
The case of post-accession policy making in Bulgaria and Romania’. Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 52, No. 1. 
 
CBOS (translated from Polish) ‘The Dynamics of Support for the SLD 1997-2011’. 
BS/117/2011 (CBOS: Warsaw) Available at http://www.cbos.pl. 
 
 30 
Cohen, S.J. (1999) Politics Without a Past: the Absence of History in Postcommunist 
Nationalism (Durham and London: Duke University Press). 
 
Darden, K. (2008) ‘The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Informal State 
Institution’. Politics and Society, Vol. 36, No. 1, pp. 35-60. 
 
Dassonneville, R. and M. Hooghe (2011) ‘Mapping Electoral Volatility in Europe: An 
Analysis of Trends in European Democracies Since 1945’. Paper presented at the first 
European Conference on Comparative Electoral Research, Sofia, Bulgaria, 1-3 
December. 
 
Downs, A. (1957) An economic theory of democracy (New York: Harper and Row). 
 





Epstein, R. (2014) ‘Overcoming “Economic Backwardness” in the European Union’. 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 52, No. 1. 
 
Ganev, V.I. (2001) ‘The Separation of Party and State as a Logistical problem: a Glance 
at Causes of State Weakness in Postcommunism’. East European Politics and Societies, 
Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 401-413. 
 
 31 
Grzymała-Busse, A. and P Jones-Luong (2002) ‘Reconceptualizing the State: Lessons 
From Post-communism’. Politics and Society, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 529-554. 
 
Grzymała-Busse, A. (2007) Rebuilding Leviathan: Party Competition and State 
Exploitation in Post-Communist Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Hancke, R. and L. Kurekova, (September 2008) ‘Varieties of Capitalism and Economic 
Governance in Central Europe’. Report for NewGov/STACEE. Mimeo. 
 
Hellman, J.S. (1998) ‘Winner Takes All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Post-
Communist Transitions’. World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 203-234.  
 
Hellman, J.S., G. Jones and D. Kaufmann (2000) ‘Seize the State, Seize the Day: State 
Capture: Corruption, and Influence in Transition’. Policy Research Working Paper, No. 
2444, World Bank, pp. 2-3. 
 
Hopkin, J and C.Paolucci (1999) ‘New Parties and the Business Firm Model of Party 
Organization: Cases from Spain and Italy’. European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 
35, No.3, pp. 307-339. 
 




Jacoby, W. (2014) ‘The EU Factor in Fat Times and Lean: Did the EU Amplify the 
Boom and Soften the Bust?’ Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 52, No. 1.  
 
Jordan, J.M. (2002) ‘Patronage and Corruption in the Czech Republic’. SAIS Review, 
Vol. 2, No. 22, (Summer-Fall), pp. 19-52. 
 
Katz, R. and Mair, P. (1995) ‘Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party 
Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party’. Party Politics, Vol. 1, pp. 5-28. 
 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi (2010) ‘The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators, Methodology and Analytical Issues’. Policy Research Paper No. 5430, 
(September) World Bank. 
 
Kirchheimer, O. (1966) ‘The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems.’ In 
La Palombara, J. and Weiner,M. (eds) Political Parties and Political Development 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
 
Kitschelt, H. (1994) The Transformation of European Social Democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
 
Kitschelt, H. (2010) ‘The Comparative Analysis of Electoral and Partisan politics: A 
Comment on the Special Issue of West European Politics’. West European Politics, Vol. 
33, No. 3, pp. 659-672. 
 33 
 
Koole, R. A. (1994) ‘The Vulnerability of the Modern Cadre Party in the Netherlands.’ In 
Katz, R. S. and Mair, P. (eds) How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Western 
Democracies (London: Sage Publications), pp. 278-303.   
 
Mungiu, A. (2006) ‘Corruption: Diagnosis and Treatment’ Journal of Democracy, Vol. 
17, No. 3. pp. 86-99. 
 
Panebianco, A. (1988) Political Parties: Organisation and Power (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
 
Pierson, P. (2001) The New Politics of the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press). 
 
O’Dwyer, C. (2006) Runaway State-Building: Patronage Politics and Democratic 
Development (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press). 
 
OECDa, ‘Tax burden trends, 2000-2011’. Taxing Wages 2011. Available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/tax_wages-2011-7-en.p161. 
 
OECDb. OECD Employment Outlook 2008, (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2008). 
 
 34 
OECDc. (2009) ‘Czech Republic Phase 2: Follow up Report on the Implementation of 
the Phase 2 Recommendations. Application of the Convention on Combating the Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997 Revised 
Recommendations on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions’.  
Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs (Paris: OECD). 
 
Ost, D. (2005) The Defeat of Solidarity: Anger and Politics in Post-communist Europe 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press). 
 
Rohrscheider, R. and S. Whitefield (2009) ‘Understanding Cleavages in Party Systems: 
Issue Position and Issue Salience in 13 Post-communist Democracies’. Comparative 
Political Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 280-313. 
 
Riboud, M., C. Sanchez-Parama and C. Silva-Jauregui, (2002) ‘Does Eurosclerosis 
Matter? Institutional Reform and Labour Market Performance in Central and Eastern 
Europe’. World Bank Technical Paper, No. 519 (Washington: World Bank). 
 
Ruggie, J.G. (1982) ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded 
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order’. International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2, 
pp. 195-232. 
 
Scherpereel, J. (2009) Governing the Czech Republic and Slovakia: Between State 
Socialism and the European Union (First Forum Press). 
 35 
Sedelmeier, U. (2014) ‘Anchoring democracy from above? The European Union’s 
measures against democratic backsliding in Hungary and Romania after accession’. 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 52. No. 1. 
 
Shefter, M. (1994) Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience 
(Princeton, NJ; Princeton University Press). 
 
SIGMA (2003) Candidate Countries Assessment: Anti-Corruption and Integrity 
Frameworks, September 2003, SIGMA/OECD (Paris). 
 
Staranová, S. (2010) ‘Regulatory Impact Assessment: Formal Institutionalisation and 
Practice’. Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 117-136. 
 
Tavits, M. (2005) ‘The Development of Stable Party Support: Electoral Dynamics in 
Post-Communist Europe’. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 
283-298. 
 
Tavits, M. (2012) ‘Organising for Success: Party Organisational Strength and Electoral 




World Bank (2011). World Economic Forum data from 2008, cited in ‘Trends in 
corruption and regulatory burden in Eastern Europe and Central Asia’. A World Bank 
Study, No. 59465. 
 
ZIndex (2011) Press Release, Prague 26 January. (ZIndex, the public procurement 
monitoring project, is led by John Chvalkovská, Petr Jansky and Goerge Skuhrovec, 






Falbr, R. (2011) 21
st
 April. Sněmovní 11. Prague. 
 
Ondracka, D. (2011) 18
th
 April. Transparency International, Sokolovska 143, Prague. 
 
Outrata, E. (2005) 30
th
 November. The Senate, Wallenstein Palace, Prague. 
 
